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Abstract: This paper is motivated by the questions of how to give the concept of probability
an adequate real-world meaning, and how to explain a certain type of phenomenon that can be
found, for instance, in Ellsberg’s paradox. It attempts to answer these questions by construct-
ing an alternative theory to one that was proposed in earlier papers on the basis of various
important criticisms that were raised against this earlier theory. The conceptual principles of
the corresponding definition of probability are laid out and explained in detail. In particular,
what is required to fully specify a probability distribution under this definition is not just the
distribution function of the variable concerned, but also an assessment of the internal and/or
the external strength of this function relative to other distribution functions of interest. This
way of defining probability is applied to various examples and problems including, perhaps
most notably, to a long-running controversy concerning the distinction between Bayesian and
fiducial inference. The characteristics of this definition of probability are carefully evaluated in
terms of the issues that it sets out to address.
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1. Introduction
Over the years the issue of how to give the concept of probability a real-world meaning has
proved to be controversial, see for example Fine (1973), Gillies (2000) and Eagle (2011).
Closely related to this issue is the problem of how to adequately elicit subjective proba-
bilities in any given practical context. Various approaches have been suggested to tackle
this latter problem, see for example, Kadane and Wolfson (1998), Garthwaite, Kadane
and O’Hagan (2005), O’Hagan et al. (2006) and Kynn (2008). A method incorporated
into some of these approaches involves comparing the likeliness of any given event of
interest with the likeliness of various given unions of outcomes of a standard experiment,
e.g. drawing a ball out of an urn containing distinctly labelled balls or spinning what is
known as a probability wheel (see Spetzler and Stael von Holstein 1975).
In Bowater (2017a) a definition of the probability of an event was proposed, namely
type B probability, that was based around this elicitation method, and in particular, on
ordering the similarities that are felt between the likeliness of the two events in various
given event pairings. This definition was subsequently extended in Bowater (2017b) so
that continuous probability distributions could be characterized in an analogous manner,
and was applied to the problem of statistical inference both in Bowater (2017b) and
Bowater and Guzma´n (2018). However, the following criticisms have been raised against
this definition of probability:
1) It is unclear how probabilities can be made to obey the additivity rule of probability,
which is regarded as one of the main aims of the definition.
2) It is inconvenient that probabilities are only defined at evenly spaced points on the
interval [0, 1] with the spacing between points being potentially quite large.
3) The dependency of probabilities on a reference set of events is unattractive.
4) The definition does not appear to be universal, e.g. the type of characterization this
2
definition gives to continuous probability distributions was not extended to discrete or
categorical probability distributions.
The main aim of the present paper is to substantially overhaul this definition of prob-
ability in a way that attempts to address these criticisms.
As well as trying to give probability an adequate real-world meaning, the work outlined
in the present paper, as was the case in Bowater (2017a), is motivated by the question
of how to explain a particular type of phenomenon which can not be easily explained
by applying the conventional mathematical definition of probability. One of the most
standard (but perhaps one of the least convincing) instances of this type of phenomenon
can be found in what is known as Ellsberg’s two colour or two urn example, see Ells-
berg (1961). Given that some readers may not be familiar with this example it will now
be briefly outlined.
Let us imagine that there are two urns that both contain 100 balls where each ball
may be either red or black in colour. In the first urn the ratio of red to black balls is
entirely unknown, i.e. there may be from 0 to 100 red or black balls in the urn. By
contrast, in the second urn it is known that there are exactly 50 red balls and 50 black
balls. An individual is asked to decide which urn he would prefer to randomly draw a
ball out of if getting a red ball wins $100 while getting a black ball wins nothing, and
which urn he would prefer if a black ball wins $100 while a red ball wins nothing.
In Ellsberg (1961) it is claimed that, first, the majority of people would prefer the
second urn in response to both questions, which is a claim supported by later experi-
ments, e.g. Fellner (1961), Becker and Brownson (1964) and Curley and Yates (1989)
and, perhaps more importantly, that this behaviour can not be assumed to be irrational.
This type of behaviour is regarded by some as representing a paradox, and is in fact
known as a version of Ellsberg’s paradox, as it goes against the idea that an individual
would prefer the urn associated with the highest probability of winning the prize or be
3
indifferent between urns that have the same probability of winning the prize.
Having clarified the motivation for this paper, let us give a brief description of its
structure. The main theoretical principles of the definition of probability that will be
proposed are laid out and explained in detail in the sections that immediately follow, in
particular Sections 2.1 to 3.5. A substantive application of this definition of probability
is then presented in Sections 3.6 and 3.7, and a possible extension to the main theory
with regard to a special case is proposed in Section 3.8. The final two sections of the
paper discuss how well the theory achieves the objectives that have been outlined in the
present section.
2. Fundamental concepts
2.1. Disclaimer
While the theory that will be outlined in the present paper has a great deal in common
with the theory outlined in Bowater (2017a, 2017b), it is nevertheless a theory that is
intended as a substitute for, rather than an extension of, this earlier theory. As a result
the definitions used in the present paper generally stand alone from those used in these
earlier papers, and caution is recommended in using this earlier work to try to gain
greater insight about the present work.
2.2. Probabilities and probability distributions
In contrast to Bowater (2017a, 2017b) where the concept of strength was developed
separately for the probability of an event and for continuous probability distributions,
here the concept of strength will be defined primarily as a concept that is applied to
(cumulative) distribution functions.
A probability distribution will be defined by its distribution function and the strength
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of this function relative to other distribution functions of interest. The distribution func-
tion will be defined as having the standard mathematical properties of such a function.
The definition of the concept of strength will be outlined and discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 3, after some more fundamental concepts have been presented in the sections that
immediately follow.
In the theory that will be developed, the probabilities of events will be analysed in
the context of the discrete or continuous distribution functions to which they must be
associated. This includes the simple case where the distribution function is defined by just
the probability of a given event and that of its complement, i.e. a Bernoulli distribution
function.
2.3. Similarity
Let S(A,B) denote the similarity that a given individual feels there is between his confi-
dence (or conviction) that an event A will occur and his confidence (or conviction) that
an event B will occur. For any three events A, B and C, it will be assumed that an
individual is capable of deciding whether or not the orderings S(A,B) > S(A,C) and
S(A,B) < S(A,C) are applicable. The notation S(A,B) = S(A,C) will be used to
represent the case where neither of these orderings apply. However, for any fourth event
D, it will not be assumed, in general, that an individual is capable of deciding whether or
not the orderings S(A,B) > S(C,D) and S(A,B) < S(C,D) are applicable. Therefore,
a similarity S(A,B) can be categorized as a partially orderable attribute of any given
pair of events A and B. This is essentially the same definition of the concept of similarity
as used in Bowater (2017a, 2017b).
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2.4. Reference sets of events
Definition 1: Discrete reference set of events
Let O = {O1, O2, . . . , Ok} be a finite ordered set of k mutually exclusive and exhaustive
events. It will be assumed that for any given three subsets O(1), O(2) and O(3) of the
set O that contain the same number of events, the following is true:
S
 ⋃
Oi∈O(1)
Oi,
⋃
Oi∈O(2)
Oi
 = S
 ⋃
Oi∈O(1)
Oi,
⋃
Oi∈O(3)
Oi

It now follows that the discrete reference set of events R is defined by
R = {R(λ) : λ ∈ Λ} (1)
where R(λ) = O1 ∪O2 ∪ · · · ∪Oλk and Λ = {1/k, 2/k, . . . , (k − 1)/k}
It should be clear that any given individual could easily decide that the set of all the
outcomes of drawing a ball out of an urn containing k distinctly labelled balls could be
the set O.
Definition 2: Continuous reference set of events
Let V be a random variable that must take a value in the interval Λ = (0, 1). It will be
assumed that for any given three subsets Λ(1), Λ(2) and Λ(3) of the interval (0, 1) that
have the same total length, the following is true:
S({V ∈ Λ(1)}, {V ∈ Λ(2)}) = S({V ∈ Λ(1)}, {V ∈ Λ(3)})
It now follows that the continuous reference set of events R is defined by equation (1)
but with the set Λ defined as it is presently, i.e. as the interval (0, 1) and the event R(λ)
defined to be the event {V < λ}.
Again, it should be clear that any given individual could easily decide that the outcome
of spinning a wheel of unit circumference, as defined by the position on its circumference
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indicated by a fixed pointer in its centre, could be the variable V , assuming the position
is measured as the distance in a given direction around the circumference from a given
point on the circumference.
2.5. Scaling events
A scaling event L(λ) will be defined as the event {V ∗ < λ}, where λ ∈ [0, 1] and V ∗ has
the same definition as the random variable V used in Definition 2 but with the added
condition that it must be the outcome of a well-understood physical experiment, such as
the outcome of spinning the type of wheel described in the previous section. Since what
does or does not constitute a well-understood physical experiment is rather vague, the
definition of a scaling event is open to criticism. The relevance of this criticism should
be taken into account with respect to the way scaling events are used in the rest of this
paper.
2.6. Compatibility of reference sets
A discrete or continuous reference set R0 will be defined as being compatible with a
discrete or continuous reference set R1 if Λ0 ∩ Λ1 6= ∅, where Λ0 and Λ1 are the sets of
allowable values of λ for R0 and R1 respectively and, for all conceivable pairs of events
E0 and E1, and all λ ∈ Λ0 ∩ Λ1, it holds that
S(E1, R0(λ)) > S(E0, R0(λ)) if and only if S(E1, R1(λ)) > S(E0, R1(λ))
For example, we would expect a rational individual to decide that a reference set R0
based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball from an urn containing 10 distinctly labelled
balls is compatible with a reference set R1 based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball
from an urn containing 100 distinctly labelled balls, where the set Λ0 ∩ Λ1 would be of
course equal to the set Λ0 = {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}. Also, a rational individual may well
7
decide that a reference set R0 based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball from an urn
containing k distinctly labelled balls is compatible with a reference set R1 based on the
outcome of spinning the type of wheel described in Section 2.4, where the set Λ0 ∩ Λ1
would be of course equal to the set Λ0 = {1/k, 2/k, . . . , (k − 1)/k}.
On the other hand, similar to Ellsberg’s two urn example described in the Introduction,
let us imagine that there are two urns that both contain k balls, where each ball has been
marked with a number that is in the range from 1 to k. In the first urn, the number
of balls that have been marked with any given number is entirely unknown, i.e. there
may be 0 to k balls marked with any given number, while in the second urn, similar to
the example that has just been discussed, we know that there is exactly one ball that
has been marked with any given number. Here, in comparison to the earlier examples,
it would be expected that a much smaller proportion of rational individuals would be
prepared to treat a reference set R0 based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball from the
first urn as being compatible with a reference set R1 based on the outcomes of drawing
out a ball from the second urn.
3. Strength of a distribution function
3.1. Overview
As mentioned in Section 2.2, in order to complete the definition of a probability distri-
bution, the strength of its distribution function relative to other distribution functions of
interest needs to be established. In the following sections, the strength of a distribution
function will be defined in terms of the context in which the concept of strength is being
applied.
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3.2. When eliciting a distribution function
First, we will define the concept of strength in the case where a given individual is trying
to elicit a distribution function for a given random variable X based on his own personal
opinion. In this context, it would seem appropriate to use a concept of strength that
will be referred to as internal strength. This concept will now be defined separately for
continuous and for discrete distribution functions.
Definition 3: Internal strength for continuous distribution functions
Let a given continuous random variable X of possibly various dimensions have two pro-
posed distribution functions FX(x) and GX(x). We define the set of events F [a] by
F [a] =
{
{X ∈ A} :
∫
A
fX(x)dx = a
}
(2)
where {X ∈ A} is the event that X lies in the set A and fX(x) is the density function
corresponding to FX(x), and we define the set G[a] in the same way with respect to
the distribution function GX(x). It now follows that for a given discrete or continuous
reference set of events R that are independent of X, the distribution function FX(x) is
defined as being internally stronger than the distribution function GX(x) at the resolution
level λ, where λ is any value in the set Λ corresponding to the set R, if
min
A∈F [λ]
S(A,R(λ)) > min
A∈G[λ]
S(A,R(λ)) (3)
To give an example of the application of this definition, let us imagine that a doctor is
trying to elicit a distribution function for the change in average survival time X caused
by the administration of a new drug in comparison to a standard drug. We will assume
that the reference set of events R is based on the outcome of spinning the type of wheel
described in Section 2.4, and that the resolution λ is some value in the interval [0.05, 0.95].
Let GX(x) be the current proposed distribution function for X. The aim is therefore to
try to adjust this distribution function so that it better represents what is known about
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the variable X, which we will regard as being equivalent to achieving some kind of overall
increase in the similarities S(A,R(λ)) where A ∈ G[λ].
In particular, it is natural to put more attention on increasing the smaller of these
similarities without lowering by too much, or at all, the larger of these similarities. Hence,
it would seem sensible to take another step in the elicitation process if an alternative
distribution function FX(x) is judged as being (according to Definition 3) internally
stronger than the distribution function GX(x). The distribution function FX(x) would
then become the current proposed distribution function for X, and the elicitation process
would continue until no improvements to this distribution function can be made.
Definition 4: Internal strength for discrete distribution functions
Let a given discrete random variable X that can only take a value x that belongs to the
finite or countable set {x1, x2, . . .} have two proposed distribution functions FX(x) and
GX(x). Also, let the events L1(b1), L2(b2), . . . be scaling events (as defined in Section 2.5)
that are independent of the variable X. Furthermore, we define the set of events F [a] by
F [a] =
{ ∞⋃
i=1
(Li(bi) ∩ {X = xi})
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
i=1
[ bi ∈ (0, 1) ] ≤ 1 ∧
∞∑
i=1
bifX(xi) = a
}
(4)
where fX(x) is the probability mass function corresponding to FX(x), and [ ] on the
right-hand side of this equation denotes the indicator function, and we define the set of
events G[a] in the same way with respect to GX(x).
It now follows that, for a given discrete or continuous reference set of events R that are
independent of X and the scaling events L1(b1), L1(b2), . . ., the function FX(x) is defined
as being internally stronger than the function GX(x) at the resolution λ, where λ ∈ Λ, if
the condition in equation (3) is satisfied with respect to the definitions currently being
used.
One of the reasons for the first predicate in the definition of F [a] in equation (4), i.e.
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the condition that at most only value in the set b1, b2, . . . is not equal to 0 or 1, is that
without this predicate there would be an event in the set F [a] that would be effectively
equivalent to any of the scaling events L1(a), L2(a), . . ., i.e. the event corresponding to
bi = a ∀i. In other words, the event would have the very undesirable property of not
depending on the distribution function of interest FX(x). The practical importance of
this issue will perhaps be more clearly seen when this definition of F [a] is used again in
Section 3.3.
The application of Definition 4 of internal strength can be illustrated by imagining
that an election for a state governor has five candidates, and a political analyst is trying
to elicit probabilities for the events x1, x2, ..., x5 of each one of these candidates winning.
The reference set of events R and the resolution λ will be defined as in the previous
example, and let the current proposed distribution function and mass function for the
variable in question be GX(x) and gX(x) respectively. At any given stage of the elicitation
process, the smaller of the similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ G[λ]} will usually
be caused by one or two of the probabilities in the set {gX(xi) : i = 1, 2, ..., 5} being
relatively poor representations of the analyst’s beliefs. This being the case, it would
seem natural that the next step in the elicitation process would be to try to lessen this
important defect, which effectively means that we should try to increase the minimum
similarity on the right-hand side of equation (3). Hence, it would seem sensible to allow
an alternative distribution function FX(x) to replace GX(x) as the current proposed
distribution function for X if it is (according to Definition 4) internally stronger than the
distribution function GX(x).
3.3. When comparing elicited or given distribution functions
Although the concept of internal strength can be regarded as the basis of a natural
way of eliciting distribution functions, it does not really provide us with a useful means
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of comparing the nature of distribution functions that have been already elicited for
different random variables. Therefore, once a distribution function has been elicited, an
alternative concept of strength is required so that the function can be interpreted in this
more outward-looking context. This alternative concept of strength will be referred to as
external strength. It is a concept that not only can be applied to distribution functions
that need to be derived using the kind of systematic elicitation process referred to in the
previous section, but also to distribution functions that are directly identified as providing
the best representations of our beliefs, which will be referred to as ‘given’ distribution
functions, e.g. the distribution function of a variable that represents the outcome of a
well-understood physical process. As was the case for internal strength, the concept of
external strength will be defined separately for continuous and for discrete distribution
functions.
Definition 5: External strength for elicited or given continuous distribution
functions
Let two continuous random variables X and Y of possibly different dimensions have
elicited or given distribution functions FX(x) and GY (y) respectively. We define the set
of events F [a] as in equation (2), and we define the set G[a] in the same way with respect
to the variable Y instead of X and the distribution function GY (y) instead of FX(x).
It now follows that, for a given discrete or continuous reference set of events R that
are independent of X and Y , the function FX(x) is defined as being externally stronger
than the function GY (y) at the resolution λ, where λ ∈ Λ, if
SF = min
A∈F [λ]
S(A,R(λ)) > max
A∈G[λ]
S(A,R(λ)) = SG (5)
This definition can be interpreted as meaning that if the function FX(x) is judged as
being externally stronger than the function GY (y) then, relative to the reference event
R(λ), it better represents the uncertainty associated with the variable X than GY (y)
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represents the uncertainty associated with the variable Y .
In comparison to the definition of internal strength in equation (3), it is naturally
appealing to have the maximization operator on the right-hand side of equation (5)
instead of the minimization operator, as this of course implies that all the similarities in
the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ F [λ]} are greater than any similarity in the set {S(A,R(λ)) :
A ∈ G[λ]}. However, it would not have been sensible to have defined internal strength
such that the maximization instead of the minimization operator appears on the right-
hand side of equation (3), as using such a strong condition as the basis for an elicitation
process would generally impede the ease with which such a process could develop.
To give an example of the application of Definition 5, let us compare a uniform distri-
bution function FX(x) over (0, 1) for the output X of a pseudo-random number generator
that has been very carefully designed to produce approximately uniform random numbers
in (0, 1) with a doctor’s elicited distribution function GY (y) for the change in average
survival time Y caused by the administration of a new drug in comparison to a standard
drug. The reference set of events R and the resolution λ will defined as in the previous
examples.
Under these assumptions, it would be expected that the similarities in the set
{S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ F [λ]} would all be regarded as being quite high. This is because
the event R(λ) is the outcome of a well-understood physical experiment, i.e. a random
spin of a wheel, while any event in the set F [λ] feels like it can be almost be treated as
though it is the outcome of a well-understood physical experiment. On the other hand,
the doctor’s uncertainty about whether or not any given event in the set G[λ] will occur
can be regarded as depending largely on his incomplete knowledge about highly complex
biological processes in the human body. Therefore it would be expected that, according
to Definition 5, the function FX(x) would be judged as being externally stronger than the
function GY (y) which can be interpreted as meaning that, relative to the spin-of-a-wheel
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event R(λ), the function FX(x) performs better than the function GY (y) at representing
the uncertainty that these functions are intended to represent.
Definition 6: External strength for elicited or given discrete distribution func-
tions
Let X and Y be two discrete random variables that can only take values in the finite
or countable sets x = {x1, x2, . . .} and y = {y1, y2, . . .} respectively, and let FX(x) and
GY (y) be elicited or given distribution functions for these two variables respectively. Also,
let the events L1(b1), L2(b2), . . . be scaling events that are independent of the variables
X and Y . Furthermore, we define the set of events F [a] as in equation (4), and we define
the set G[a] in the same way with respect to the variable Y and the distribution function
GY (y).
It now follows that, for a given discrete or continuous reference set of events R that
are independent of the variables X and Y and the scaling events L1(b1), L2(b2), . . ., the
function FX(x) is defined as being externally stronger than the function GY (y) at the
resolution λ, where λ ∈ Λ, if the condition in equation (5) is satisfied with respect to the
definitions currently being used.
This definition can be applied to the motivating example referred to in the Intro-
duction, i.e. Ellsberg’s two urn example. In particular, we will denote the outcomes of
drawing a ball out of the first urn and the second urn in this example as the random
variables X and Y respectively, and we will denote the distribution functions for these
two variables as FX(x) and GY (y) respectively. The reference set R and the resolution
λ will be defined as in the earlier examples. Now let us imagine that, with regard to
both the first and the second urns, an individual elicits a probability mass function that
assigns a probability of 0.5 to both the events of drawing out a red ball and drawing out
a black ball. This would seem to be quite a rational decision to make.
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Since both FX(x) and GY (y) effectively define a Bernoulli distribution function, the
sets of events F [λ] and G[λ] will only contain two events. For example, the sets F [0.5]
and G[0.5] simply contain the events of drawing out a red ball and drawing out a black
ball from the first and second urns respectively. In applying Definition 6 of external
strength to this particular case, i.e. the case where λ = 0.5, it should be fairly clear why
the individual is likely to decide that the similarities between the spin-of-a-wheel event
R(0.5) and the events in G[0.5] are higher than the similarities between R(0.5) and the
events in F [0.5]. By doing this, he would be of course deciding that the distribution
function GY (y) is externally stronger than the distribution function FX(x). A similar
line of reasoning can be used to justify the same decision for other values of λ. If the
individual prefers monetary rewards that are associated with the outcomes from the urn
in Ellsberg’s two urn example that is associated with the distribution function that is
externally stronger than the distribution function associated with the other urn, then the
‘paradoxical’ behaviour identified by Ellsberg in this example can be accounted for by
the definition of probability outlined in the present work.
We also could consider applying Definition 6 to the governor election example outlined
in Section 3.2 under the assumption that the political analyst has already used Defini-
tion 4 of internal strength to elicit a distribution function HZ(z) to the events z1, z2,
..., z5 of each of the five candidates winning. With the reference set R and the resolu-
tion λ defined as in the previous examples, it should be fairly clear why this distribution
function is likely to be considered externally weaker than the distribution function GY (y)
from Ellsberg’s two urn example. However, it would be much less easy to predict whether
any given political analyst would decide that the function HZ(z) is externally stronger,
weaker or neither stronger nor weaker than the distribution function FX(x) from this
earlier example.
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3.4. Sensitivity to the choice of the reference set R and the resolution λ
In general, Definitions 3 to 6 of internal and external strength depend on the reference
set of events R being used. More comments will be made with regard to this matter in
Section 4. However for now, let us clarify that if, according to the definition given in
Section 2.6, a discrete or continuous reference set R0 is compatible with another discrete
or continuous reference set R1, then Definitions 3 to 6 will not be affected by whether
the reference set R0 or R1 is used, provided that the resolution λ ∈ Λ0 ∩ Λ1, where Λ0
and Λ1 are as defined in Section 2.6.
With regard to the choice of the resolution level λ, it could be argued that the further
that λ is away from the value 0.5, the greater the detail in which the characteristics of the
distribution functions involved in the Definitions 3 to 6 may be explored. On the other
hand, it is known that people have difficulty in weighing up the uncertainty associated
with events that are very unlikely or very likely to occur, which is a disadvantage that
could apply if λ was less than say 0.05 or greater than say 0.95. Nevertheless, it would
be expected that in many applications, Definitions 3 to 6 will be largely insensitive to
the choice of the value of λ over the range [0.05, 0.95], which is the range for λ that has
been used in the examples that have been considered so far.
3.5. When comparing distribution functions derived by formal reasoning
Of course, not all distribution functions can be regarded as having been derived by some
method of direct evaluation. Therefore, let us now turn our attention to defining the
concept of strength in the case where we wish to compare the nature of distribution
functions that have been derived using any type of method including through the use of
a formal system of reasoning, e.g. derived by applying the standard rules of probability. In
particular, this will be achieved by simply using a more general definition of the concept
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of external strength than the definitions of this concept presented in Section 3.3.
Definition 7: General definition of external strength
Let two random variables X and Y have distribution functions FX(x) and GY (y) respec-
tively. Also, let MF and MG be two sets of reasoning processes that could be used to
measure the minimum similarity SF and the maximum similarity SG respectively, where
these similarities are as defined in equation (5), and where the assumptions underlying
this equation correspond to Definition 5 if the variables X and Y are continuous or to
Definition 6 if these variables are discrete.
It now follows that, for a given discrete or continuous reference set of events R that
satisfies the assumptions of Definition 5 if the variables X and Y are continuous or the
assumptions of Definition 6 if these variables are discrete, the function FX(x) is defined
as being externally stronger than the function GY (y) at the resolution λ, where λ ∈ Λ, if
max
M ∈MF
SF > max
M ∈MG
SG (6)
where M ∈M denotes ‘over all reasoning processes in the set M’.
Clearly in the special case considered in Section 3.3, the setsMF andMG each contain
only one reasoning process, which is the method of direct evaluation. More generally
though we are faced with the problem that Definition 7 may depend on the choices that
are made for the sets MF and MG. In many cases, this problem can be largely avoided
by choosing the sets MF and MG to be large enough so that they contain all methods
of reasoning that are relevant to measuring the similarities concerned. However, as will
be illustrated in Section 3.6, this may be difficult to achieve if there are one or more
potentially relevant methods of reasoning that are not well understood.
Observe that when distribution functions are derived by formal systems of reasoning
rather than by a direct method of evaluation, the problem also arises that the distribution
function for any given random variable may itself depend on which system of reasoning
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is used to derive it. Due to this possibility, the following definition is required.
Definition 8: Criterion for choosing between distribution functions
We will assume that FX(x) and GX(x) are two proposed distribution functions for the
random variable X that have been derived using two separate methods of reasoning.
Under this assumption if, in Definition 7, the random variable Y is assumed to be equiv-
alent to X, and the sets MF andMG are regarded by the given individual who has the
task of evaluating the similarities in equation (6) as containing all methods of reasoning
that are relevant for this task, then the function FX(x) will be favoured over GX(x) as
being the distribution function for X if it is externally stronger than GX(x) according to
Definition 7.
We can interpret this definition as meaning that FX(x) will be favoured over GX(x)
as being the distribution function of X if, relative to the reference event R(λ), it better
represents the uncertainty associated with the variable X than the function GX(x).
3.6. Applying the concept of strength to the Bayesian-fiducial controversy
In this section, we will apply the concept of external strength to the controversy about
whether fiducial reasoning is of any use in circumstances where the fiducial distribution
function is equal to a posterior distribution function corresponding to a given choice
of the prior distribution function. We will concern ourselves only with the case where
inferences need to be made about the mean µ of a normal density function that has a
known variance σ2 on the basis of a random sample x of n values drawn from the density
function, since it will be seen that the issues that are explored in analysing this case are
relevant to many other cases. The type of fiducial inference that will be applied will be
subjective fiducial inference as outlined in Bowater and Guzma´n (2018).
Let it be assumed that very little or nothing was known about µ before the sample x
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was observed. In a Bayesian analysis, it is common to try to represent this lack of prior
knowledge by placing a diffuse symmetric density function over µ centred at some given
prior median µ0. Assuming this has been done, let the corresponding prior and posterior
distribution functions be denoted as D(µ) and D(µ |x) respectively. However, these
distribution functions are not sufficient to define the prior and posterior distributions of
µ under the definition of probability being considered. As has already been established,
to complete these definitions we need to evaluate the strengths of these distribution
functions relative to other distribution functions of interest. In the current context, it is
clear that this needs to be done by applying Definition 7 of external strength.
To apply this definition, it will be assumed that there is only the method of direct
evaluation in the set of reasoning processesMµ that will used to measure the similarities
in equation (6) with respect to the prior distribution function D(µ), and that there is
only Bayesian reasoning in the set of reasoning processesMµ|x that will used to measure
these similarities with respect to the posterior distribution function D(µ |x). By Bayesian
reasoning it is meant any system of reasoning that is related to the way that Bayes’
theorem updates the prior to the posterior distribution function by combining it with
the likelihood function. The reference set R and the resolution λ will be defined as in
previous examples.
Under these assumptions, if the set of events Dµ[λ] is defined as the set F [λ] was
defined in equation (2) but with respect to the variable µ and the prior distribution
function D(µ), then it would be expected that the similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) :
A ∈ Dµ[λ]} would all be regarded as being very low. In fact, we would expect that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any directly elicited distribution function (for
any random variable in any context) that could be regarded as being externally weaker
than the prior distribution function D(µ) according to Definition 7. This is because,
apart from needing to satisfy the condition that it is diffuse and symmetric, the choice
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of the prior density function for µ when there is very little or no prior information about
µ will be extremely arbitrary, implying that the definition of the events in the set Dµ[λ]
will be just as arbitrary. For example, if λ = 0.5 then the set Dµ[λ] will contain the
events {µ < µ0} and {µ > µ0} which clearly depend on the very arbitrary choice of the
prior median µ0. In general, for all values of λ in [0.05, 0.95], the events in the set Dµ[λ]
will also depend on the arbitrary decision that needs to be made about how diffuse the
prior density function for µ should be.
Let Dµ|x[λ] be defined as F [λ] was defined in equation (2) but with respect to the
variable µ and the posterior distribution function D(µ |x). Since the posterior density
function for µ is determined through Bayes’ theorem simply by reweighting the prior
density function for µ, that is, by normalizing the density function that results from
multiplying the prior density function by the likelihood function, it would seem difficult
to apply a Bayesian reasoning process, i.e. a member of the set Mµ|x, to argue that the
similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Dµ|x[λ]} should be generally larger than the
similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Dµ[λ]}. For this reason, under the assumptions
that have been made, it can be argued that it should be difficult, if not impossible, to
find a directly elicited distribution function that could be regarded as being externally
weaker than the posterior distribution function D(µ |x) according to Definition 7.
It is common practice to try to approximate the posterior distribution function D(µ |x)
with a distribution function C(µ |x) that is the result of using Bayes’ theorem to update
a prior density function of the form c(µ) = constant ∀µ ∈ (−∞,∞). We should first
note that, under the definition of probability being used in the present work, it would
seem inappropriate to refer to C(µ |x) as a posterior distribution function, since it is
based on a prior density function c(µ) that does not follow the standard mathematical
rules of probability, in particular it is an improper density function. Second, since the
function C(µ |x) is only being used to approximate the function D(µ |x), its external
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strength relative to other distribution functions must be inherited from D(µ |x), i.e. it
must be roughly determined by the external strength of D(µ |x) relative to the functions
in question.
We will now turn to the application of subjective fiducial inference to the case of in-
terest. The terminology that will be used corresponds to Bowater and Guzma´n (2018),
nevertheless the way that subjective fiducial inference will be applied to this case is equiv-
alent to what was outlined in both Bowater (2017b) and Bowater and Guzma´n (2018).
Since the sample mean x¯ is a sufficient statistic for µ, it can be assumed to be the
fiducial statistic in this case. Defining the primary random variable (primary r.v.) Γ
as having a standard normal density means that it can be assumed that the data x is
generated by the following data generating algorithm:
1) Generate a value γ for the random variable Γ by randomly drawing this value from
the standard normal density function.
2) Determine x¯ by setting Γ equal to γ and X equal to x¯ in the transformation
X = µ+ (σ/
√
n)Γ (7)
3) Generate the data set x by conditioning the joint density function of this data set
given µ on the already generated value of the sample mean x¯.
It now follows that the fiducial distribution function of µ is determined, according to the
general rule given in Bowater and Guzma´n (2018), by setting X equal to x¯ and treating
µ as a random variable in equation (7), which implies that this distribution function is
defined by the expression
µ |σ2, x ∼ N(x¯, σ2/n)
This distribution function of µ is the same as the function C(µ |x) that was defined
earlier. However, to evaluate the external strength of this distribution function relative
to other distribution functions, it will now be assumed that fiducial reasoning is the
only type of reasoning in the set of reasoning processesMC that, under the definition in
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equation (6), will be used to measure the similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Cµ|x[λ]},
where Cµ|x[λ] is defined as F [λ] was defined in equation (2) but with respect to the
variable µ and the distribution function C(µ |x). By fiducial reasoning it is meant any
system of reasoning that directly attempts to justify the fiducial argument, which will be
interpreted to be the argument that the density function of the primary r.v. Γ should be
the same both before and after the data x has been observed.
To perform the task just mentioned, let us proceed by reanalysing one of the abstract
scenarios that were outlined in Bowater (2017b). In the scenario in question, it is imag-
ined that someone, who will be referred to as the selector, randomly draws a ball out
of an urn containing 7 red balls and 3 blue balls and then, without looking at the ball,
hands it to an assistant. The assistant, by contrast, looks at the ball, but conceals it
from the selector, and then places it under a cup. The selector believes that the assistant
smiled when he looked at the ball. Finally, the selector is asked to assign a probability
to the event that the ball under the cup is red. We assume that it was known from the
outset that the aim of this exercise was for the selector to assign a probability to this
particular event.
In this scenario, let us now imagine that, relative to other distribution functions of
interest, the selector wishes to evaluate the external strength of the Bernoulli distribution
function BY (y) that corresponds to assigning a probability of 0.7 to the event that the
ball under the cup is red (y = 1), and a probability of 0.3 to the event that it is blue
(y = 0). This means that he will need to evaluate the similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) :
A ∈ B[λ]}, where the set B[λ] is defined as F [λ] was defined in equation (4) but with
respect to the variable Y and the distribution function BY (y), which of course implies
that it can only contain two events.
In doing this, it will be assumed that the selector takes into account the fact that a
smile by the assistant would be information that could imply that it is less likely or more
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likely that the ball under the cup is red. Therefore, his evaluation of the similarities in
question must depend on his subjective judgement regarding the meaning of the assis-
tant’s supposed smile. Nevertheless, he may feel that, if the assistant had indeed smiled,
he would not really have understood the smile’s meaning. In this case, it would seem
rational for him to conclude that the similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ B[λ]} could
be at least approximately evaluated by making the assumption that he had put the ball
directly under the cup rather than giving the assistant an opportunity to look at the
ball. Under this assumption, since along with the event R(λ), the propensity of either of
the two events in B[λ] to occur would only depend on the outcome of a well-understood
physical experiment, it would be expected that he would regard both of the similarities
in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ B[λ]} as being equal or very close to the highest possible
similarity that can exist between two events, which is a conclusion that therefore could be
justified as being valid or approximately valid in the scenario that is of genuine interest.
Returning to the evaluation of the relative external strength of the fiducial distribution
function C(µ |x), let us assume that, in step 1 of the data generating algorithm outlined
above, the value γ of the primary r.v. Γ is generated by a well-understood physical
experiment, which is usually a reasonable assumption to make. We will now make an
analogy between the uncertainty about the value of γ after the data has been observed in
this case, and the uncertainty about the colour of the ball under the cup in the scenario
that has just been outlined. In particular, given that little or nothing was known about
µ before the data x was observed, the event of observing the data should be akin to
the event of the selector believing that the assistant smiled when he looked at the ball
in question, and hence this event should have little or no meaning in terms of its effect
on the uncertainty that is felt about the value of γ. As a result if, after the data has
been observed, Γ is assigned the same distribution function as before the data has been
observed, i.e. a standard normal distribution function, then it would be expected that
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the relative external strength of this function would be regarded as being similar to the
relative external strength of the function BY (y). Since the distribution function C(µ |x)
is fully defined by this distribution function for Γ and known constants, it can therefore
be argued that the similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Cµ|x[λ]} as defined earlier
should all be regarded as being equal or quite close to the highest possible similarity that
can exist between two events.
This conclusion could hardly be more different to the conclusion that was reached when
the relative external strength of the same distribution function C(µ |x) was evaluated by
effectively taking into account its approximation to the distribution function D(µ |x), and
then applying only Bayesian reasoning. On account of this, and in accordance with the
definition of a probability distribution given in Section 2.2, it could be proposed that the
posterior distribution for µ that corresponds to the use of a flat improper prior density for
µ would be better described as the fiducial distribution for µ, since the relative external
strength of the distribution function in question C(µ |x) would be naturally justified using
fiducial rather than Bayesian reasoning, and arguably rather than any other currently
known form of statistical reasoning, if all these reasoning processes were included in the
set MC .
3.7. Example of using Definition 8 to choose between distribution functions
We will now apply Definition 8 to an example where there are two possible distribution
functions for the same random variable. In particular, let it be imagined that in the case
analysed in the previous section, there is now a notable but quite a low level of prior belief
that µ will not be a very long distance from a given value µ1. We will assume that in
applying the Bayesian method, this prior belief about µ is represented as a normal prior
density function for µ with mean µ1 and a moderate to large variance. Let the resulting
posterior distribution function be denoted by I(µ |x). Alternatively, we could apply the
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fiducial method to this problem, under the assumption that it may be adequate to not
take into account the prior belief about µ in forming a post-data distribution function
for µ. Therefore, again the fiducial distribution function for µ will be C(µ |x) as defined
in Section 3.6.
Let Iµ|x[λ] be defined as F [λ] was defined in equation (2) but with respect to the
variable µ and the distribution function I(µ |x). Now, in applying Definition 8 to choose
which is the most appropriate distribution function for µ out of I(µ |x) and C(µ |x) after
the data has been observed, let us assume that the set of reasoning processes that will
be used to evaluate both the set of similarities {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Iµ|x[λ]} and the set
{S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Cµ|x[λ]} contains both Bayesian and standard fiducial reasoning but
no other method of reasoning. It is clear though that the former set of similarities can
only be evaluated indirectly using fiducial reasoning, while the latter set of similarities
can only be evaluated indirectly using Bayesian reasoning.
If we apply Bayesian reasoning to evaluate the similarities {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Iµ|x[λ]},
then since choosing a prior density function to represent the prior beliefs about µ in
question is still fairly arbitrary, it would be expected that these similarities will be
regarded in general as being only moderately higher than the similarities in the set
{S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Dµ|x[λ]}, under the assumption that these latter similarities are
evaluated in the context of the case considered in Section 3.6.
To evaluate the similarities {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Cµ|x[λ]} in the present context by
applying fiducial reasoning, it again seems sensible to first analyse the relative external
strength of the standard normal distribution function as the distribution function of the
primary r.v. Γ after the data has been observed. In particular, it would seem without
doubt that the presence of the prior beliefs about µ in question should have the effect
of lessening our degree of comfort in assuming that this distribution function is still
standard normal. However, since the prior beliefs about µ have been assumed to be
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quite vague, this effect may be considered negligible if the sample size is large, and
even if the sample size is small, it may still not be considered as being a very large effect.
Therefore, although the similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Cµ|x[λ]}may be regarded
in general as being lower than if these similarities were evaluated in the context of the
case considered in Section 3.6, they nevertheless may be regarded in general as being still
substantially higher than the similarities in the set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ Iµ|x[λ]}, where
these latter similarities must of course be evaluated either by using Bayesian reasoning,
or by treating the distribution function I(µ |x) as an approximation to C(µ |x) under
fiducial reasoning. This can be interpreted as meaning that according to Definition 7, the
distribution function C(µ |x) would be regarded as being externally stronger than the
function I(µ |x), which in turn would imply that, according to Definition 8, the function
C(µ |x) would be favoured over I(µ |x) as being the distribution function of µ after the
data has been observed.
The case has therefore been made in this section that, if Bayesian and standard fiducial
reasoning are the only allowable reasoning processes in evaluating the similarities of
interest, then even when there is notable prior information about µ, it may not in fact
be worth taking into account this information in establishing a post-data distribution
function for µ, due to the detrimental effect this may have on the relative external
strength of the distribution function concerned.
3.8. Continuous measurement of external strength
The concept of external strength has been defined as an ordinal measurement, i.e. using
the definitions that have been given we are able to rank distribution functions in terms
of their external strength. However, a question that naturally arises is whether it is
possible to measure on a continuous scale some kind of characteristic that incorporates
the essence of the concept of external strength. In this section, we will only consider how
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this could be done in the special case where we wish to compare distribution functions
that have already been classified as even-similarity distribution functions according to
the following definition.
Definition 9: An even-similarity distribution function
If FX(x) is the distribution function of a random variable X then, for a given reference
set of events R that satisfies the assumptions of Definition 3 or Definition 4 depending
respectively on whether X is a continuous or a discrete variable, the function FX(x) will
be defined as being an even-similarity distribution function at the resolution level λ, if the
minimum similarity SF is equal to the maximum similarity SF according to the notation
used in equation (5).
A continuous measure of external strength could now be defined in the following way.
Definition 10: Proposed continuous measure of external strength
With respect to a given reference set of events R and a given resolution λ, let FX(x),
GY (y) and HZ(z) be even-strength distribution functions for any three given random
variables X, Y and Z respectively, where X and Z are independent from each other
and, according to Definition 7, the function GY (y) is not externally weaker than FX(x)
and is not externally stronger than HZ(z). We define F [λ] according to Definition 3 or
Definition 4 depending respectively on whether X is a discrete or a continuous variable,
and we define G[λ] and H[λ] in the same way but with regard to the variables Y and
Z and the distribution functions GY (y) and HZ(z) respectively, where the two sets of
scaling events L1(b1), L2(b2), . . . that are possibly used in the definitions of F [λ] and H[λ]
are independent from each other.
Now, if the event R(λ) is independent of the variables X, Y and Z, and of the scaling
events that may have been used to define F [λ], G[λ] or H[λ], then for any three events
A, B and C that are members of the sets F [λ], G[λ] and H[λ] respectively, it would be
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reasonable to assume in general that a value of α ∈ [0, 1] could be found that satisfies
the condition:
S(B,R(λ)) = S( (A ∩ L(α)c) ∪ (C ∩ L(α)), R(λ) ) (8)
where L(α) is a scaling event that is independent of the variable X, the variable Z, the
event R(λ) and the scaling events that may have been used to define the sets F [λ] and
H[λ], and where L(α)c denotes the complement of L(α).
This value of α could then be interpreted as a continuous measure of the external
strength of the distribution function GY (y) relative to both the distribution functions
FX(x) and HZ(z). For instance, a small value of α would indicate that the external
strength of the function GY (y) is closer to that of the function FX(x) than to that of
the function HZ(z), while a large value of α would indicate that the external strength of
GY (y) is closer to that of HZ(z) than to that of FX(x). However, it will be assumed that
this continuous measure of external strength may only be applied in cases where it can
not or does not contradict the general definition of external strength, i.e. Definition 7.
To give an example, we can apply Definition 10 to the case considered in Section 3.6.
In particular, it would appear acceptable to assume that the function FX(x) in this
definition could be the prior or posterior distribution function D(µ) or D(µ |x), the
function GY (y) could be the fiducial distribution function C(µ |x), and the function
HZ(z) could be the Bernoulli distribution function UZ(z) that corresponds to assigning
a probability of λ to the event of drawing a ball out of an urn containing k distinctly
labelled balls that belongs to a given subset of λk balls (z = 1), and a probability of 1−λ
to the complement of this event (z = 0). If it is also assumed that the similarity on the
left-hand side of equation (8) is evaluated by using fiducial reasoning, and the similarity
on the right-hand side of this equation is evaluated directly if FX(x) is taken to be D(µ),
or by using Bayesian reasoning if FX(x) is taken to be D(µ |x), then by using the same
type of principles that were explained in Section 3.6, it could be argued that α should be
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equal or close to one, which could be interpreted as meaning that the external strength
of C(µ |x) is equal to that of UZ(z), or is at least much closer to that of UZ(z) than to
that of D(µ) or D(µ |x).
4. Discussion
We will now discuss how well the theory outlined in the present paper addresses the
criticisms 1 to 4 listed in the Introduction of the definition of probability outlined in
Bowater (2017a, 2017b).
Criticism 1: Satisfying the additivity rule of probability
Obeying the additivity rule is no longer a goal for the theory, as was the case in Bowa-
ter (2017a), but rather an assumption upon which the definition of probability is con-
structed. In particular, to guarantee that this assumption is satisfied, this definition
has been based exclusively on probability distribution functions instead of also basing
it on the probabilities of events in isolation. Nevertheless, in any given situation, the
adequacy of making the assumption that probabilities are additive is reflected in the
relative external strengths that are associated with the distribution functions concerned.
For example, if FX(x) is the distribution function of a given random variable X, but the
assumption that the probabilities of X lying in different subsets of the sample space of
X are additive was difficult to make, then we would not expect all the similarities in the
set {S(A,R(λ)) : A ∈ F [λ]} to be regarded as being close to the highest similarity that
can exist between two events, where the reference set R and the resolution λ are defined
as in earlier examples.
Criticism 2: Precision of probability values
Unlike in Bowater (2017a, 2017b) where probabilities were only defined at potentially
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quite widely spaced points on the continuous interval [0, 1], probabilities can now take
any value in this interval. Observe that this is the case even if the reference set of
events R is discrete, as the precision by which probabilities can be measured is no longer
determined by how the set R is defined as was the case in these earlier papers.
However, in contrast to this earlier work, there is no guarantee that the probability
that is elicited to any given event is a unique value. This is because there may be a
set F ∗ of possible distribution functions FX(x) for a given variable X, each member of
which is regarded to be internally stronger than any function FX(x) not in this set, but
not internally stronger than any other function FX(x) within this set. It would be hoped
though that usually the distribution functions in the set F ∗ would be fairly similar to
each other. In this type of situation, it is recommendable that any statistical analysis
that requires a distribution function for X as an input incorporates a sensitivity analysis
over the functions FX(x) in the set F
∗.
Criticism 3: Dependence of probabilities on the reference set
As was the case in Bowater (2017a, 2017b), probabilities depend in general on the refer-
ence set of events R with respect to which they are defined. This is due to the fact that,
in general, the relative internal and external strengths of a distribution function depend
on the reference set R that is being used. As alluded to in Section 3.4, this issue though
is made substantially less important by taking into account that reference sets may often
be regarded as being compatible according to the definition given in Section 2.6.
We could of course attempt to remove this dependence completely by defining the refer-
ence set of eventsR under the added condition that the set of eventsO = {O1, O2, . . . , Ok}
in the case where R is discrete, or the continuous variable V in the case where R is con-
tinuous, must be the outcomes or outcome of a well-understood physical experiment. For
a continuous reference set R, this would mean that the set R would be composed entirely
of scaling events according to the definition in Section 2.5. However, placing this extra
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condition on the set R would not appear to be that helpful for at least two reasons.
First, since the definition of the set F [a] for a continuous distribution function given
in equation (2) does not depend on the concept of a scaling event, the definitions of the
set R given in Section 2.4 allow us at least to define the concepts of relative internal and
external strength of a continuous distribution function without entering into a potentially
woolly discussion about when an outcome or set of outcomes can or should be classified as
being generated by a well-understood physical experiment. The second reason for using
these earlier given definitions of the set R is that, in some situations, it may be useful to
base assessments of uncertainty on a set R that contains events that are not associated
at all with the outcome or outcomes of a well-understood physical experiment.
In particular, if the goal of an individual is to communicate his personal uncertainty
about a random variable to others, then this may not be easy to do if he was evaluated the
distribution function of the variable as being relatively externally weak. Therefore, the
individual may wish to find an alternative reference set R that contains events associated
with a standardized form of uncertainty that can be clearly appreciated by many people,
but also with respect to which he would consider the distribution function of the variable
concerned as being relatively externally strong.
As alluded to in Section 3.3, if the reference set of events R is based on the outcome
of spinning the type of wheel described in Section 2.4, then for any resolution λ in
the interval [0.05, 0.95], it may be difficult to regard the distribution function HZ(z)
associated with the governor election example, where z = {z1, z2, ..., z5} are the events
of each of the five candidates winning, as being relatively externally strong. To give an
example of the argument that has just been put forward, let us now change the reference
set of events R to the reference set described in Section 2.6 that is based on the outcomes
of drawing a ball out an urn that is known to only contain balls marked with a number
in the range 1 to k, but for which the number of balls marked with any given number
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is entirely unknown. Under this assumption, it would seem plausible that, for any given
resolution λ in [0.05, 0.95] permitted by the definition of the set R, a rational individual
possibly could regard the distribution function HZ(z) just referred to as being relatively
externally strong. Given that also the events in the reference set R are associated with
a fairly standard and easily understood type of uncertainty, an individual may feel it is
easier to convey his personal uncertainty about the outcome of the governor election to
others by using this alternative reference set rather the original reference set.
Criticism 4: Lack of universality of the definition
The present work has addressed the lack of universality of the definition of probability
outlined in Bowater (2017a, 2017b) by defining the concepts of internal and external
strength so that they can be applied not just to continuous but also to discrete dis-
tribution functions, while at the same time eliminating the rather cumbersome notion
advocated in these earlier papers that the concept of strength can also be applied to
the probability of an individual event without any consideration of its association with
a specified distribution function. Nevertheless, if desired, we can of course define this
distribution function to be just the probability of the event and that of its complement,
i.e. a Bernoulli distribution function.
5. Some closing remarks
Returning to the overall motivation for the theory outlined in the present paper and for
the earlier theory that was outlined in Bowater (2017a, 2017b), it is hoped, even more
than was the case for this earlier theory, that the present theory gives the concept of
probability a natural and useful real-world meaning. Moreover, it was shown in Sec-
tion 3.3 how the present theory can account for a rational preference for the second urn
in Ellsberg’s two urn example, and how, by accounting for the same type of phenomenon,
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it can justify the use of fiducial rather than Bayesian reasoning in the examples that were
discussed in Sections 3.6 and 3.7. Therefore, it is hoped that this theory has adequately
achieved all the goals that were set out at the start of this paper.
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